U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

                                Washington, D.C. 20549

                          NOTICE OF EXEMPT SOLICITATION

                          Submitted pursuant to Rule 14a-6(g)

1.  Name of the Registrant:
    The Houston Exploration Company

2.  Name of person relying on exemption:
    JANA Partners LLC

3.  Address of person relying on exemption:
    200 Park Avenue, Suite 3300, New York, New York 10166

4.  Written materials. Attach written materials required to be submitted
    pursuant to Rule 14a-6(g)(1):









 AN OPEN LETTER TO THE SHAREHOLDERS OF THE HOUSTON EXPLORATION COMPANY FROM JANA
                                  PARTNERS LLC

April 24, 2006


Ladies & Gentlemen,

     We are  contacting  you  because we believe  the time has come to deliver a
message to the Board of  Directors  (the  "Board")  of The  Houston  Exploration
Company  ("Houston  Exploration"  or the  "Company")  that they must reverse the
Company's history of underperformance  and immediately embark on a clear path to
maximizing value for shareholders.  This week's annual meeting offers the chance
to put directors on notice that  shareholders  are keenly focused on the Board's
next steps and to warn them of the  consequences  of squandering the opportunity
they  presently  have  to  deliver  the  highest   possible   returns  to  their
shareholders.

     As you may know,  last week we called  upon the Board to use the  available
proceeds of the recent $590 million Gulf of Mexico asset sale and the  Company's
underleveraged balance sheet to repurchase a significant amount of the Company's
currently  undervalued  stock.  Assuming  the Company  uses these sale  proceeds
together with additional leverage to repurchase  approximately 11 million of its
shares,  we believe it could  increase 2007 EPS by over 40%. As we outlined last
week in our letter to the  Board,  given the  Company's  woeful  performance  in
comparison  to its peers,  it is all the more apparent that the Board must seize
this opportunity immediately for shareholders.

     The Board's  response to our analysis on how best to maximize value however
has been  unsatisfactory in every way and evidences a shocking disregard for the
pursuit of  shareholder  value.  Rather than  committing  to seeking the highest
possible return for  shareholders,  the Board appears intent on following a plan
which we believe is certain to deliver  lower  returns for  shareholders  than a
significant  share repurchase.  Furthermore,  the members of the Board appear to
feel no obligation to make any real attempt to offer a coherent  explanation for
their unwillingness to deviate from this course.

     -- IF YOU WISH TO SEND A MESSAGE TO THE BOARD THAT THEY MUST TAKE IMMEDIATE
STEPS TO DELIVER  MAXIMUM  VALUE,  SELECT THE  "WITHHOLD  ALL  NOMINEES"  OPTION
CORRESPONDING TO "DIRECTORS" ON THE PROXY CARD PROVIDED TO YOU BY THE COMPANY OR
ON THE APPLICABLE PROXY VOTING WEBSITE, OR IF YOU ARE VOTING BY TELEPHONE SELECT
SUCH OPTION WHEN PROMPTED.

     PROXIES MUST BE SUBMITTED PRIOR TO THE COMPANY'S  ANNUAL MEETING,  WHICH IS
SCHEDULED TO BE HELD ON FRIDAY,  APRIL 28, 2006.  SHAREHOLDERS  SHOULD THEREFORE
SUBMIT THEIR PROXIES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.  EVEN IF YOU HAVE ALREADY  VOTED,  YOU
CAN  CHANGE  YOUR  VOTE AT ANY  TIME  PRIOR  TO THE  ANNUAL  MEETING  SIMPLY  BY
SUBMITTING A NEW PROXY WITH YOUR NEW ELECTIONS.  ONLY  SHAREHOLDERS OF RECORD AS
OF MARCH 9, 2006 MAY VOTE AT THIS YEAR'S  ANNUAL  MEETING.  SHAREHOLDERS  SHOULD
CONTACT THEIR BROKERS WITH ANY QUESTIONS. --

     In response to our call last week for a significant share repurchase, which
followed  previous  discussions  with the  Company  in which  we  explained  the
benefits of doing so, we received  from the Board what looked like a form letter
making a vague  reference  to  exploring  the  issue and  thanking  JANA for its
"interest in our company" (an interesting  choice of words  considering that the
Board members own less than one-half of a percent of the Company's shares).  The
Board in its letter then  reiterated the Company's  intention to repurchase only
$200  million of its shares,  rather than putting all of the  available  Gulf of
Mexico sale proceeds into the share repurchase,  and have said they will use the
remainder for other uses including  acquisitions and debt repayment.  It appears
that about as much  thought  and effort was put into this  response as went into
the Board's earlier responses when presented with our analysis,  which is to say
almost none.





     We  say  this  because  the  Board  has  offered  nothing  in  the  way  of
quantitative  analysis  or even  rational  qualitative  analysis  to justify its
announced  intentions.  Rather than  attempting to demonstrate  that their plans
offer the most value for shareholders,  the Board's methodology in arriving at a
$200 million repurchase amount appears to have been limited to selecting a nice,
round number.  No effort has been made to prove to  shareholders  that the Board
has carefully  considered its options and is making the best possible use of the
Company's  assets.  As we have said, it appears quite clear in fact that such an
analysis would show that the opposite is true.

     First,  we  believe  the  evidence  is  indisputable   that  there  are  no
acquisitions  the  Company  can  pursue  that will be nearly as  accretive  as a
substantial share repurchase.  Even the simplest analysis  demonstrates that the
Company is highly unlikely to find acquisitions at multiples lower than those at
which  its  stock is  currently  valued.  Even if it were to do so,  significant
execution  risk for  onshore  acquisitions  is likely to  further  diminish  the
returns  such  acquisitions  might  deliver.  We note  again  that we have fully
accounted for the potential tax benefits associated with using the sale proceeds
to purchase new assets in coming to this conclusion.

     Second, the Board has offered no compelling justification for using any
of the proceeds of the Gulf of Mexico sale to repay debt rather than to help
fund a significant share repurchase. Nor have they offered a satisfactory
explanation for why they refuse to increase leverage to provide the remainder of
the funding for such a share repurchase, despite clear evidence that doing so
would greatly benefit shareholders while leaving the Company with a more
efficient capital structure. Their sole justification, which is maintaining the
Company's current high debt rating, does almost nothing to improve shareholder
returns, whereas using the strength of the Company's balance sheet to repurchase
additional shares will deliver substantial value. To the extent that the
Company's agreements with its creditors place restraints on their ability to
undertake such actions, the Company should open negotiations with such lenders
to permit them, as is quite common in such situations, or if necessary to
refinance such obligations.

     The Board has a fiduciary  duty to its  shareholders  do to more than mouth
empty phrases and  platitudes  as they proceed  blindly with plans which are all
but guaranteed to squander  shareholder  assets.  However,  the Board appears to
feel that because the issue regarding the use of the Gulf of Mexico proceeds has
arisen shortly before the annual meeting,  at which they are running  unopposed,
they are free to pay lip service to demands that they pursue value maximization.

     We also note that Houston Exploration's bylaws have been crafted to provide
the  Board  an  extraordinary  amount  of  cover  from  shareholder  demands.  A
shareholder  seeking to nominate new  directors  would have to have notified the
Company  almost SIX MONTHS in advance of this year's  meeting (a length which is
at the far extreme of the range for such periods and is clearly at odds with any
reasonable  notion of good  corporate  governance).  In other  words,  the Board
essentially  gives  itself a pass for  almost  a year and a half,  knowing  that
shareholders wishing to seek new representation as result of the Board's actions
must do so almost six months  before the annual  meeting or wait up to almost 18
months for the next meeting.  This  egregiously  early deadline is what makes it
possible for the Board to announce  that it intends to pursue a course of action
that it  appears  to have done no  legitimate  analysis  regarding  and which we
believe will create far less value for  shareholders  than a  significant  share
repurchase,  yet  remain  immune to  shareholder  challenge  at the next  annual
meeting.

     For these reasons, we are encouraging all shareholders to send a message to
the Board that they must not  squander  the proceeds of the Gulf of Mexico sale,
assets which belong to the shareholders, on value-destroying  acquisitions,  and
that  they  must  instead  put this  money to work for  shareholders  through  a
significant share repurchase.

     While the Board faces no opposition this year and thus will  undoubtedly be
re-elected,  choosing to  withhold  your vote for all  directors  at this week's
annual





meeting will tell them that while their seats may be safe for this year,
shareholders  are watching  them closely and demand  results.  No board can hide
from its shareholders  forever, and we encourage you to take this opportunity to
serve  clear  notice  to the  Board  that  you will not  hesitate  to hold  them
accountable,  even if such  accountability  is deferred until next year,  should
they fail to immediately pursue maximum value for all shareholders.

Sincerely,


/s/ Barry Rosenstein

Barry Rosenstein
JANA Partners LLC
Managing Partner


BR/CP/AR